I. INTRODUCTION
Elizabeth Smart may be a household name, but the names of the thousands of foster children currently missing from our child welfare system are unknown to the American public and even to some of the agencies legally responsible for their care. Each year, vast numbers of these young people, who are predominantly children of color, become victims of sexual exploitation while in the custody of the state or shortly after their planned release. At this rate, and given population trends, the number of sexually exploited youth with a history of foster care will climb to close to half a million in the next generation. 1 The plight of these young people raises a unique legal question: Do state and contract agencies bare any liability for this exploitation? Foster children are in a unique position vis-a-vis the Constitution. They are wards of the state but actually fare worse in federal courts than prisoners and institutionalized adults, in terms of their right to be free from harm while in custody. To be fair, it is not easy to monitor foster children; they are statutorily entitled to the least restrictive foster care placement, as they should be. But every effort should be made to ensure that they go unscathed. Too often, as a result of institutional indifference, older foster youth are harmed due to a lack of commitment to addressing their needs.
Even if it were well settled that the state owes a unique duty to foster children, would this duty extend to youth who have absconded from custody and been lured into "criminal" activity? What about youth who have been discharged, but to precarious situations that put them at foreseeable risk? Recent federal legislation regarding the sexual exploitation of foster youth demonstrates political concern on the national stage, but the laws have no teeth. Our states and localities do not actually invest in this population; nor do our federal or state lawmakers hold anyone accountable for what happens to adolescents while they are in the foster care system or following discharge. Are we finally ready to hold child welfare agencies accountable for what happens to foster children when they are missing or discharged from the system? Could federal courts address this epidemic?
Constitutional law regarding prisoners, institutionalized adults, and the residents of nursing homes suggests that it is time for the judiciary to step in. The civil rights of other populations have not been addressed from the ground up without court intervention. Unless we hold state agencies accountable, they will never fully address the needs of adolescents in foster care; nor will they truly revolutionize their service models to provide client-centered services that actually work. Litigation is necessary in order to effectuate foster children's rights and realize actual reform in the child welfare system. 1 19%. 13 Thirteen other states all age at least 10% of their foster children out of foster care. 14 In fact, thousands of youth currently in foster care have been assigned goals by their state agencies that are essentially the same as independent living, but with new names, such as "emancipation" or "long-term foster care." 15 These permanency goals indicate that child welfare officials no longer focus on seeking families or other supportive adults to help transition these older youths from foster care. In 2005, approximately 32,000 adolescents had a goal of "emancipation," and more than 37,000 had a goal of "long term foster care." 16 These 69,000 youths, and those that have followed in the past nine years, were on a path to leave foster care without a permanent family to count on. 17 
B. Adolescents Missing from Foster Care
Another estimated 30,000 youths age out of the foster care system but are not officially counted by the state as discharged, because they run away or are otherwise unable to be located by the state. 18 Child welfare professionalscaseworkers, social workers, therapists, lawyers, and judges-routinely refer to runaways from foster care, as Absent Without Leave, or "AWOL." This language speaks to the impersonal and implicitly punitive nature of the system. Children who run away from their family homes are never called AWOL by anyone, even when they appear in court or at an institution such as a shelter. This Article does not use this negative terminology; instead, in line with other studies, the Article includes as "missing" foster children all those who have either left care voluntarily (i.e., run away) or involuntarily (i.e., been abducted) and/or cannot otherwise be accounted for by the agency responsible for their placement (i.e., lost in care). 19 It is extremely difficult to ascertain precise numbers of missing foster children because inherently, these children are lost and state and local authorities have no incentive to report them as such or acknowledge that they have lost track of their wards. In fact, there are no provisions in the federal legislation governing foster care 20 that specifically address the prevention, 13 Id.
14 Id. 16 TIME FOR REFORM, supra note 11, at 3. 17 Id. response to, or resolution of missing episodes. 21 Caseworkers are not required to report missing foster children to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), the agency whose federal mandate 22 is to work in partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice to help states find missing children (including foster children), eliminate child sexual exploitation, and prevent child victimization. Although state agencies make reports to the federal government, 23 the federal government does not follow up on what happens to these children or on whether these numbers are accurate. 24 Moreover, each state has its own internal reporting and classification systems for youth who run; 25 some do not classify "runaways" at all. 26 One thing we know for sure: 61% of homeless 18-and 19-year-olds have been in foster care at some point. 27 No national numbers are available regarding the number of youth who run away from foster care. 28 However, data from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) 29 Authorization] . A summary of NCMEC's duties include: operating a national 24-hour toll-free telephone line by which individuals may report information regarding the location of any missing child and assisting the efforts of law enforcement agencies in coordinating with child welfare agencies to respond to foster children missing from the state welfare system. They also provide technical assistance to law enforcement agencies and first responders in identifying, locating, and recovering victims of, and children at risk for, child sex trafficking. Id. , available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport17.pdf. 24 CWLA, supra note 21. There are no provisions in federal foster care law which specifically address or require states to report missing foster children, nor are there any that require the federal government to track missing foster children. Id. runaway status. 30 Significantly, 5.5% of the youths ages 14 to 17 in placement were on runaway status; 31 roughly 8% of all 17-year-olds were on runaway status. 32 Because these counts were taken on a single day, they underestimate the percentage of youth who may have run away at some time during that year or during their entire time in foster care. 33 Also, individual states (and counties) have different practices for categorizing a child as a runaway. 34 For example, according to state records, there were zero 17-year-olds on runaway "status" in New Hampshire on September 30, 2009, but in Texas, 17.4% of all 17-yearolds were on runaway status. 35 Eleven states and the District of Columbia do not use "runaway" as a reason for official discharge, but in Oregon, 17.2% of children are discharged as runaways. 36 It is impossible, therefore, to know how much of the disparity in runaway "rates" is due to real differences in youth behavior and how much is due to different coding practices. 37 However, according to this wildly inconsistent data, of all youths discharged from care during 2009, 2% were discharged due to being on runaway status; 38 3.5% of all 17-year-olds were discharged as runaways.
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There are also a significant number of minors who should be taken in to custody by a state's child welfare system after being kicked out or running away from home, but who, for various reasons, are not picked up. These youths fall through the cracks for two primary reasons:
First, child welfare agencies often hesitate to take custody of older youth. Appropriate placements are scarce, and achieving permanency is challenging. Second, many unaccompanied youth strive to avoid entering the child welfare system, due to loyalty to parents, fear of retribution against themselves or siblings, unwillingness to relinquish control over their lives, or mistrust of the child welfare system.
40
A U.S. Department of Health and Human Services study found that 46% of homeless youth left their family's home (not foster home) because of physical 30 Id.
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Pergamit, supra note 25, at 8. 34 Id.
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Id. at 9. 39 Id.
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Welfare Advocates, supra note 27. abuse; 17% left because of sexual abuse. 41 Over 50% of young people in shelters and on the streets report that their parents told them to leave or knew they were leaving and did not care. 42 Each year, 1.6 to 1.7 million youths run away or are forced out of their homes by their parents or other caretakers.
43
As far as raw numbers regarding foster children who are missing or have run away, the only data available are from sporadic reports in newspapers and independent investigations. In 2002, Michigan acknowledged that it had lost track of 302 foster children. 44 In the 1990s, New York City recorded an average of 4,000 runaways from foster care per year. 45 Florida acknowledged 648 missing children in 2006. 46 But, again, these are inherently underestimates; they only include children classified by state governments as "runaways," and, as noted, some states do not even use this classification. 47 It does not count all the children the state cannot physically locate at any given point in time.
Studies by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) indicate higher raw numbers of runaway and missing foster children than the individual state and city accounts discussed above. The Vera Institute in New York City found that of those youths who first enter foster care as adolescents, 40% had at least one reported "missing" child during their time in care. 48 According to another study, 46% of 17-year-olds in foster care in Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin reported having run away at some time; 49 in Illinois alone, the rate was 52%.
50
Nearly two-thirds of those who ran away did so more than once. 51 Id.
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Id.
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study of 17-year-olds in Los Angeles foster care found 36% had run away from care at least once.
52
According to a 2013 article in The Oklahoman, children in a foster care shelter are free to leave at any time and "if the child is above the age of 15, or sometimes if they are above the age of 13 and 'seem particularly mature,' the shelter staff will not follow the child nor will the police be called." 53 The National Runaway Safeline has found that less than one quarter of youths are in touch with their caseworker while on a runaway episode.
54
The National Runaway Safeline's research also indicates that youths are both literally and figuratively overlooked by caseworkers. According to their field work, youth who run away want to see their families more often and believe that more needs to be done to obviate the effects of being placed away from their neighborhood, family, and friends. 55 The foster youth they interviewed reported a strong desire for someone to talk to, someone who will listen to them and help work through problems. 56 The youths felt that caseworkers do not provide the support they need and that caseworkers should visit more often. 57 According to the study, most youths do not hate the system or blame it for having to remove them from their home; they just want it to work better.
58
The Vera Institute conducted research which underscores why so many children stay away after they run.
Youths returning to foster care after an AWOL may not be able to return to the foster home they left, either because foster parents will not take them back or because a group home filled their beds if they were gone for more than three days. For the youth, losing their bed may mean staying the night at an emergency placement facility, registering in a new school, and Id.
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developing relationships with new caregivers and housemates. 59 Despite the numbers and consequences of runaways, the Vera Institute and The National Runaway Safeline are some of the only organizations that have actually studied the issue in depth and, most importantly, surveyed youth themselves. According to the Child Welfare League of America, the field has "a dearth of research on children missing from" 60 out-of-home care-or even promising practices-"in the prevention of, response to, and resolution of missing from care episodes."
61 This is indicative of the overall indifference to this population.
C. The Disproportionality of Adolescents of Color in Foster Care
Unlike figures on runaways, the disproportionality of minority children in the foster care system has been well documented and studied. 62 In 2008, of the estimated 399,546 children in foster care, 54% were Black, Hispanic, or Multiracial. 63 During the same time, only 37% of the general population was Black, Hispanic, or Multiracial. 64 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported in 2003 that although black children accounted for 15% of the total child population, they made up 25% of victims in substantiated cases of child maltreatment and 45% of children in foster care. 65 American Indian children compose 2% of the foster care population, nearly double their rate in the general population. 66 According to the official data, Hispanic children are Research shows that families of color, when compared with Caucasian families, have less contact with child welfare workers, receive fewer services, and are substantially less likely to receive services in their homes. 78 The children themselves receive fewer familial visits, fewer contacts with caseworkers, fewer written case plans, and fewer developmental or psychological assessments.
79
Of most significance to this Article, black children are placed in foster care at twice the rate for white children. 80 Instead of being referred to foster care, 72% of Caucasian children are served in their homes, while only 40% of Hispanic/Latino children and 44% of African American children receive inhome services. 81 Two recent studies measured African American to white placement disparity among children of different age groups in different regions and found that disparity increased for teens over time across all areas; in other words, black adolescents across the nation are placed in foster care at the highest rates. 82 Once in foster care, the median length of stay for black children is 80% longer, with an average stay of 18 months as compared to 10 months for white children. 83 African American children also experience substantially more moves while in foster care as compared to Caucasian children. 84 African American children are also less likely than children of other races to be reunited with their families. 85 Five major studies in the 1990s, and one in 2005, led to the same conclusion: that Caucasian children are reunited with their families at four times the rate of African American children. 86 This analysis found race continued to be a strong predictor of reunification, even after controlling for other factors: age of entry, parental job skills, parental 78 Id.
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substance abuse problems, and services provided to caretaker. 87 One study also demonstrated that children of color, particularly African American children, who are legally available for adoption wait longer to be adopted. 88 Older children of color in foster care also seem to receive fewer independent living services care. Of 98,561 youth receiving independent living services in 2011, the majority of these young adults were white, 32% were African American, and 20% were Hispanic. 89 All of these factors-fewer reunification services, longer stays in foster care, slower adoptions, and less access to independent living resources-contribute to the crises facing adolescents of color aging out of care 90 and in particular to their vulnerability to sexual exploitation.
D. Projections Regarding Minority Adolescents in Foster Care
According to the latest U.S. Census, for the first time, America's racial and ethnic minorities now make up about half of the under-five age group.
91
Fueled by immigration and high rates of birth, particularly among Hispanics, whites have already fallen to a minority among babies. 92 The government also projects that in five years, minorities will make up more than half of children under 18. 93 The fastest percentage growth is among multiracial Americans, followed by Asians and Hispanics. Non-Hispanic whites make up 63% of the United States; Hispanics, 17%; blacks, 12.3%; Asians, 5%; and multiracial Americans, 2.4%. 94 About 40% of whites age 25 to 29 graduate from college, compared with 15% for Latinos and 23% for blacks.
95 "'More so than ever, we need to recognize the importance of young minorities for the growth and vitality of our labor force and economy, ' Id.
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the past three years.
97 Also significant, "Non-Hispanic multiple race groups" and "race unknown" children have each increased by 1% since 2008, and have remained at 6% and 3% respectively. 98 This has serious implications for the make-up of foster care in the next generation.
There are also implications of these population changes in foster care for the next decade. According to the AFCARS, Hispanic children make up 23% of the population waiting to be adopted, which means that if they are not, they will age out of care as adolescents in the near future. 99 Unknown and multiple race children make up 9% and Native American 2% of the population waiting to be adopted, all out of proportion to their populations in foster care rolls. 100 If these children do not get adopted, which is increasingly unlikely as they get older, 101 they will be out on their own before they know it and certainly before they are ready. The tragic outcomes of youths aging out of foster care have been well documented and will not be detailed here. These outcomes include extremely high rates of homelessness, unemployment, incarceration, failure to finish high school or college, and early pregnancy. 
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A. Sexual Exploitation of Youth in the United States
An estimated 300,000 to 400,000 children are sexually exploited every year in the United States. 104 The most frequent age of entry into commercial sex industry in the United States is 12 years old. 105 The overwhelming majority of these youth have run away or been kicked out ("throwaways") of their homes or foster care placement. 106 According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in 1999, 1,682,900 youths had a period of time in which they could be characterized as a runaway or throwaway youth; 71% of these youth were considered at risk for prostitution.
107 One in three teens will be recruited by a pimp within 48 hours of leaving home, 108 and one out of three homeless teens do, in fact, resort to prostitution. 112 A 2008 report in Seattle found that 300 to 500 children were involved in prostitution in the Seattle/King County area. 113 In New York City, estimates are even higher at 2,200 youths being commercially sexually exploited.
114 Arrest numbers are also shocking considering they only take into account youth who have been found by police and are reasonably suspected of prostitution. Furthermore, according to federal law, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) 115 passed in 2000, minors are not even supposed to be arrested at all for prostitution by any law enforcement agency in the country.
116
Despite this, in California, 804 children were arrested for prostitution in the year 2010 and 363 in Texas.
117
Youth of color make up the majority of sexually exploited minors. In Los Angeles, 38% of youth under the age of 18 arrested for prostitution-related offenses identified as non-white (primarily African American). 118 Other research conducted on a subpopulation of exploited minors shows that African American girls and women are arrested in prostitution at a far higher rate than girls and women of other races involved in the same activity.
119 African American females are also sexually exploited at a younger age on average than other children. 120 In a Los Angeles study, 92% of all victims of sexual Females make up the overwhelming majority of those exploited; a 2011 report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics on the characteristics of suspected human trafficking incidents stated that almost 95% of sex trafficking victims were female. 123 Young girls are also much more likely to be arrested for prostitution-one study found that girls under the age of 18 were over 14 times more likely to be arrested for prostitution than their male peers.
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One reason, relevant to this Article, that young women are so much more likely to become sexually exploited than males is that it has been well documented that females in foster care are more likely to run away. 125 Moreover, national studies have shown that 75% of all runaways are female. 126 However, male runaways from foster care and from home are also at high risk for sexual exploitation, particularly those who identify as LGBTQ. The primary reason is that LGBTQ youth are overrepresented in the homeless youth population.
127
Data collection on this population has been difficult for a number of reasons; many youth do not self-disclose their sexual orientation or gender identity out of fear of harassment and/or discrimination, many providers harbor bias against LGBTQ youth, do not question youth about their identities, (2013) , available at http://www.youthlaw.org/fileadmin/ncyl/youthlaw/publications/Ending-CSEC-A-Call-for-Multi-System_Collaboration-in-CA.pdf. However, a recent survey reported that about 40% of homeless youth identify as LGBTQ, identifying that they are homeless because of family rejection due to their sexual orientation or gender identification. 129 This same report found that more than 40% of agencies serving homeless youth do not address issues related to this rejection. 130 Another study uncovered that a disproportionate number of male youth held in detention by police for prostitution identify as gay, bisexual, or questioning; only 1% of heterosexual boys are detained for prostitution compared with 10% of their gay, bisexual, or questioning peers.
131
"Many homeless youth engage in survival sex (exchanging sex for food, shelter, clothing, etc.)," 132 and this is particularly common for LGBTQ youths. One study found that LGBTQ "youth were three times more likely to engage in survival sex as compared to their homeless heterosexual counterparts."
133
B. Sexual Exploitation of Adolescents in Foster Care
There is an extremely strong correlation between sexual exploitation and involvement with the child welfare system. 134 First of all, as discussed in Section II, thousands of children run away from foster care each year, and runaways are susceptible to sexual exploitation. Foster youth are even more susceptible. Children who have been involved with the system are the main target of the criminals seeking children to exploit. 135 The high correlation of children with a history of abuse and sexual exploitation is also due to a number of risk factors including, "early trauma history, dangerous environments, lack of supportive caregiving, and severe mental health." 136 According to one study, 98% of children who are identified as survivors of sex trafficking had previous involvement with child welfare services. 137 More conservatively, the National Center for Exploited Children reports that 60% of runaway children who are sexually exploited had involvement with the child welfare system. 138 Half of the sexually exploited children in California were placed in foster care or a group home at some point in their life. 139 The percentages are even higher in certain areas of the state. A study in the Bay Area revealed that over 75% of the sexually exploited youths were victims of abuse or neglect. 140 Los Angeles reports 61% of sexually exploited victims were in foster care and 80% of the girls had child welfare involvement. 141 In New York City, 75% of sexually exploited children were in foster care. 142 In terms of raw numbers, which as discussed are extremely difficult to obtain, 143 we are aware of 14,900 foster youth who were sexually assaulted 135 YOUNG MINDS, supra note 134; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 31; Kovner, supra note 103 ("Trafficking of children for sex . . . was, and is, happening in Connecticut, and is as simple as a girl, or even a boy, running away from a foster home or somewhere else and bumping, literally, into a pimp trolling the mall or the park for just such a target."). Sexual exploitation does not only result when children run away from foster care, but also when they age out of care. 146 Children aging out of foster care become homeless at alarming rates, and, as discussed, all homeless youth are at high risk for sexual exploitation. The National Alliance to End Homelessness reports that 11% to 37% of all children aging out of care deal with homelessness and an additional 25% to 50% are unstably housed. 147 The United States Interagency Council on Homelessness reports that within four years of exiting the system, 25% of children will be homeless.
148 This is critical because 75% of all sexually exploited victims report being homeless. 149 Reports have shown that youth need only be on the street for no longer than seven days before they are at a higher risk of sexual exploitation. 150 The City of Seattle alone estimates that there are between 700 and 1,000 homeless youth on any given night. 151 A 1999 report found that 40% of "persons in federally funded homeless shelters were former foster youth."
152 In Massachusetts, a 2005 Census of homeless young adults ages 18 through 24, found that 25% were former foster care youth. 153 A California study found that 65% of former foster care youths age out without secured housing. Youth who have already been discharged from foster care, or who are well aware that they will be kicked out of their group or foster homes the day their foster care check stops coming, are perfect prey for pimps. In the words of the DOJ:
Pimps . . . manipulate children into a life of prostitution and then use physical and emotional abuse to keep their victims trapped in that way of life. Pimps target children who are vulnerable to exploitation, including those with low selfesteem, who are runaways or throwaways, and who have histories of physical and sexual abuse. Pimps typically recruit a vulnerable child by first showing affection and attention and promising a stable relationship. . . . After the child has been manipulated into a relationship with the pimp, the pimp begins training or "seasoning" her by normalizing the life of prostitution and making her completely dependent on him. . . . To solidify his control, the pimp . . . will beat, torture, or starve the child to force her into obedience. Some pimps use alcohol or drugs to control their victims. To manipulate the child, the pimp also uses emotional tactics such as renaming her to break down her identity and telling her that she has no value except as a prostitute. The pimp also separates the child from biological family and friends as well as anything familiar. Additionally, the pimp keeps all of the profit earned by the child and delivers violent punishment if the child withholds any money. The pimp uses a combination of praise and abuse that causes the child to constantly work for his affection. The child becomes completely dependent on the pimp for food, clothing, shelter, and attention. The pimp's control often is so complete that victims are incapable of leaving. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2013) (making "a judicial determination to the effect that continuation in the home from which removed would be contrary to the welfare of the child" a prerequisite for removal and placement into foster care). For a sample of states with similar govern foster care, with each state having its own unique system. 157 However, foster care is also regulated and funded at the federal level, primarily by Title IV-E of the Social Security Act.
158 A state's funding from the federal government is conditioned on providing all children in foster care with certain case management services.
159 Each child is entitled to a case plan which details their "permanency plan" and the services and care needed to help them achieve that goal. 160 There are only five possible permanency goals: return to parent, adoption, legal guardianship, permanent placement with a fit and willing relative, and "another planned permanent living arrangement" (APPLA).
161
APPLA is the category states use when they discharge youth to their own legal custody after turning 18. 162 No adolescent in foster care can be discharged to their own legal custody before the age of 18. 163 Under federal law, permanency plans for all adolescents in foster care age 16 and older, regardless of receiving provisions, see VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-908B (2014) ("A local department or a licensed childplacing agency shall have authority pursuant to a court order to place a child over whom it has legal custody in a permanent foster care placement where the child shall remain until attaining majority or thereafter, until the age of twenty-one years . . . ."); MINN. STAT. § 260C.201(a)(2) (2014) ("If the court finds that the child is in need of protection or services or neglected and in foster care, it shall enter an order making any of the following dispositions of the case: . . . (2) transfer legal custody to one of the following: (i) a child-placing agency; or (ii) the responsible social services agency. In making a foster care placement for a child whose custody has been transferred under this subdivision, the agency shall make an individualized determination of how the placement is in the child's best interests using the consideration for relatives and the best interest factors in section 260C.212, subdivision 2, paragraph (b) . . . ."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1307 (2014) ("Each court which has placed a child in foster care shall send to the office (a) a copy of the plan or permanency plan, prepared by the person or court in charge of the child in accordance with section 43-1312, to effectuate rehabilitation of the foster child and family unit or permanent placement of the child and (b) a copy of the progress reports as they relate to the plan or permanency plan, including, but not limited to, the court order and the report and recommendations of the guardian ad litem."). Id. § § 671(a)(15)(C), (E), 675(1)(E) (defining "case plan" to include, among other things, a "permanency plan"). 161 Id. § 675(5)(C). 162 Id. In each of the other goals, the legal custodian is either a biological parent, an adoptive parent, a legal guardian, or relative with legal custody. Id. § 675(2). 163 
Id. § 675(5)(H).
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their permanency plan, must include an independent living and transitioning plan with a written description of the programs and services that will help prepare the child for independence.
164
Until 2011, states could only claim IV-E reimbursements for children under age 18, or age 19 if the child was still in school. 165 The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (FCA), 166 and as amended in 2011, 167 made a number of changes to Title IV-E to address the needs of adolescents in and aging out of foster care. 168 FCA promotes the extension of foster care beyond 18, and conditions federal funding on ensuring that each adolescent has a coordinated transition plan, including health care, living arrangements, and employment or education plans. 169 States Id.
171
See GAO-14-347, supra note 168, at 4. Other options include: (1) authorizing states to provide and receive federal reimbursement for some kinship guardianship assistance payments, id.; (2) allowing states to waive on a case-by-case basis non safety licensing standards for relative foster families, id. at 34; (3) authorizing HHS to share information from the Federal Parent Locator Service with child welfare agencies for Title IV-E purposes, id. at 4; (4) authorizing the use of foster care maintenance payments to cover the cost of reasonable travel expenses to enable the child to remain in the school where the child was enrolled at time of placement, id. at 5; (5) allowing extended eligibility for Chafee Foster Care Independence Program Services to youth who exit foster care to adoption or kinship guardianship at age 16 or older, id. at 42; and (6) A separate federal law, The Chafee Foster Care Independence Act 172 (Chafee) was passed in 1999 to address the growing crisis of youth aging out of care.
173 It provides grants to states, apart from their Title IV-E funds, to create programs that support adolescents discharging from foster care. Chafee provides states with "flexible funding" to "enable programs to be designed and conducted" to assist former foster youth. 174 All states provide some extended services to young people 18 and older; however, the level of services varies dramatically among states. Some states, such as Iowa, provide robust postfoster care services, while others provide very little support. 
State Law Regarding Adolescents in Foster Care
All states receive federal funding for foster care 176 and are therefore supposed to comply with Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. According to federal law, as discussed above, states cannot release children to themselves (i.e., their own legal custody) until they are at least age 18. 177 Since the passage of the Fostering Care Connections Act, 24 states now allow adolescents to remain in foster care past age 18, 178 in some cases until age 21. 179 In states that extend foster care, youth who are discharged to themselves may later reenter authorizing an extended eligibility for education and training vouchers to youth who exit foster care to kinship guardianship at age 16 or older, id. at 5. 
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care. 180 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) instructions implementing the FCA permit states to extend foster care that either permits youth to remain in "care continuously or leave foster care and return . . . at some point after attaining age 18," as long as the original court order remains in effect and other IV-E eligibility criteria are satisfied.
181
B. Recent Legislation Addressing Sexual Exploitation
In 2014, the sexual exploitation of foster children gained congressional recognition with unanimous passage of H.R. 4980, the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (PSTSF).
182 "[T]he child welfare system as a whole has not truly recognized trafficking as a crisis within the foster youth population," said House of Representatives member Karen Bass, a co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on Foster Youth and an original cosponsor of H.R. 4058, during debate on the Bill.
183 According to Bass, child welfare case workers have not been adequately trained and prepared to identify or respond to child victims of trafficking. 184 Further, certain child welfare policies may have unintentional negative effects on the well-being of the children it is meant to protect. 185 The Bill's cosponsors acknowledged that some foster care regulations inadvertently increase the foster child's isolation and separation from friends, family and the surrounding community, resulting in an increased vulnerability to victimization.
186
Title I of the Preventing Sex Trafficking Act amends Title IV-E of the Social Security Act by requiring each state to develop policies and procedures for identifying, documenting, and determining appropriate services for any child or youth in care who the state has reasonable cause to believe is, or is at risk of being, a victim of sex trafficking or a severe form of trafficking in persons. 187 Id. Some rules make it difficult for foster youth to participate in sports, sleep over at a friend's house, obtain a driver's license, get a part-time job, or engage in other age-appropriate activities.
expected to report of instances of sex trafficked foster youth.
188 By September 29, 2017, this data is to be included in the adoptions and foster care analysis and reporting system (AFCRS).
189 By September 29, 2018, this data must be reported to Congress and be publically available on the HHS website.
190
PSTSF also requires states to develop and implement plans to expeditiously locate any child who has run away from care. 191 Similarly, it directs state agencies to immediately report missing or abducted children or youth to law enforcement authorities for entry into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. 192 No later than two years after enactment, using the data reported under AFCARS, HHS must report to Congress on the children who run away from foster care and their risk of becoming victims of sex trafficking. 193 The report must include characteristics of the children who run away and risk factors associated with children running away from care and summarize the state's efforts to provide specialized services placement options to child victims of sex trafficking.
194
The report must also include efforts on behalf of the state to ensure that children in care form and maintain long-lasting connections to caring adults. 195 Title II of the Act requires states to support "normalcy" 196 for foster children and extends adoption incentives. Normalcy includes implementing a "reasonable and prudent parent standard" for decisions made by foster parents or designated officials at foster care institutions. Caregivers are required to be trained in age or developmentally appropriate "reasonable and prudent parent standards." 197 The goal is to enable the caregivers to make parental decisions that "maintain the health, safety and best interest of the child" while promoting the child's participation in "extracurricular, enrichment, cultural and social activities." 198 In other words, the statute seems to be attempting to make foster care as "normal" as possible for adolescents. 188 Id. The text specifically states, "not later than . . . 2 years after such date of enactment." Id. The date of enactment was September 29, 2014. Id.
189
Id. § 103. 190 Id.
191
Id. § 104. 192 Id.
193
Id. § 105. 194 Id.
195
196
197
Id. § 111. 198 
Id.
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Title II of the Act also eliminates "Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement" (APPLA) as a permanency goal for children under age 16 199 and requires additional case plan and case review requirements for youth over 16 with a goal of APPLA. 200 This Act also empowers foster children age 14 and older to help develop or revise their own case plans. 201 These provisions are a step in the right direction toward combatting the sexual exploitation of youth in foster care. But it is not clear how the reporting directives will be enforced 202 and whether state agencies and workers will have any incentive to be truthful and meticulous. Likewise, there is no statutory incentive to address and prevent actual sexual exploitation. 203 Federal funding is not conditioned on receipt of the states' reports or on any other benchmarks.
204
There is also no threat of withholding funding if states continue to use the APPLA goal; 205 in fact, APPLA is still permitted for children over age 16 and for children under age 16 if the state agency documents "intensive, ongoing and unsuccessful efforts for family placement."
206 At this point, it is hard to foresee this legislation making an immediate or substantial dent in the hundreds of thousands of youth who are currently sexually exploited, at least not without concurrent forms of accountability. It is important to note as well that the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 207 landmark legislation 199 Id. § 112(a)(1). APPLA is amended by inserting "only in the case of a child who has attained 16 years of age" to section 475(5)(C)(i). Id.
200
Id. § 112(b)(1). In order for APPLA to remain a child's permanency goal, the state agency must document intensive, ongoing, and unsuccessful efforts for family placement, including efforts to locate biological family members using search technologies (including social media). At each permanency hearing, the agency is required to ask the child about the child's desired permanency outcome and to make a judicial determination explaining why APPLA is still the best permanency plan and why it is not in the best interest of the child to be returned home, adopted, placed with a legal guardian, or placed with a fit and willing relative. At each permanency hearing, the agency is also required to specify the steps the agency is taking to ensure the reasonable and prudent parent standard is being followed and that the child has regular, ongoing opportunities to engage in age or developmentally appropriate activities. See generally id. The law requires various different reporting measures, but prescribes no enforcement provisions other than requiring that the HHS report to Congress the numbers reported. 203 Id. The law simply requires states to report instances of sex trafficking to both the law enforcement authorities and the AFCARS and to respond and locate children who have run away from foster care. 204 Id. § 102. 205 Id. § 475A. 206 Id. 2015) . TVPA recognized that modernday slavery takes place in the context of fraud and coercion, as well as force, and defines "a commercial sex act [as one that] is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age." 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(A) (2013).
The TVPA seeks to combat trafficking by promoting a policy of "3 Ps": prosecution, protection, and prevention: Prosecution involves passing the appropriate laws that criminalize trafficking, and jailing the abusers who exploit other humans for profit. Protection involves identifying victims, providing them with medical care and shelter (and if necessary witness protection), and, when appropriate, repatriating them. Prevention involves raising awareness of the inhumane practices involved in the trafficking trade and promoting a paradigm shift that seeks to reduce the demand for the "fruits" of human trafficking. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, FIGHT SLAVERY NOW!, http://fightslaverynow.org/why-fightthere-are-27-million-reasons/the-law-and-trafficking/trafficking-victims-protection-act/traffic king-victims-protection-act/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2013) ("Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force, Fraud, or Coercion"). Section 1591 criminalizes sex trafficking, which is defined as causing a "person to engage in a commercial sex act" under certain statutorily enumerated conditions. Id. § 1591(a). A "'commercial sex act' means any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person." Id. § 1591(e)(3). The specific conditions are the use of force, fraud, or coercion, or conduct involving persons under the age of 18. Id. § 1591(a). The punishment for conduct that either involves a victim who is under the age of 14 or involves force, fraud, or coercion is any term of years or life. Id. § 1591(b)(1). The punishment for conduct that involves a victim between the ages of 14 and 18 is not to be less than ten years. Id. § 1591(b)(2).
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CIVIL 212 "Deliberate indifference" is defined as conscious or "reckless disregard" by a state actor. 213 In the last two decades, courts have occasionally found state foster care agencies to have been deliberately indifferent to the substantive due process rights of foster children.
Until the early 1990s, there was no judicial precedent at all for a foster child's due process right to be free from harm. 214 In LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 215 the court recognized that children have a right to reasonably safe placements where they will not suffer physical or emotional harm. 216 The court held that the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (DSS) 217 had a "special relationship" with the city's foster care children. 218 Hereinafter, all Departments of Social Services that are defendants in cases will be referred to as "DSS" or "the state." 218 Id. at 992 n.27.
219
The "professional judgment" standard was first articulated in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) . The professional judgment standard is discussed, infra, in text accompanying notes 232-35. "deliberate indifference" or "shock the conscience" 220 in order to find a constitutional violation?
Following the LaShawn 221 decision, the right to be free from harm has been precarious and often denied. In White by White v. Chambliss, 222 the mother filed a § 1983 suit 223 against South Carolina DSS after her daughter died in a foster home placement because of injuries (a blow to the head) sustained from the abusive foster parents. 224 The mother claimed a violation of her daughter's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 225 The court held that negligence was not enough to prove such a violation; the daughter's death did not "result from the DSS defendants' violation of any 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" 226 DSS's actions did not amount to deliberate indifference because it was not "on notice of a danger and chose to ignore the danger notwithstanding the notice." 227 Therefore, DSS was entitled to qualified immunity. 228 In Conn v. Bull, 229 a two-year-old foster child drowned in the foster mother's pool and the county was sued under a deliberate indifference 220 The Supreme Court has established three levels of fault for state action-negligence, deliberate indifference, and conduct that shocks the conscience. Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849, 851, 856 (1998). "Liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process," id. at 849; "Deliberate indifference" is the standard to employ "when actual deliberation [by a state actor] is practical," id. at 851; and the highest standard to apply is the "shocks-the-conscience" test, id. at 856. 
223
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a person acting under color of state law engaged in conduct that violated a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2013); see also Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 841. In the rest of the cases described in this Section, the plaintiffs made § 1983 claims that their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were denied. Herein, all constitutional claims described, unless otherwise indicated, were made by private citizens under § 1983 for violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 224 White, 112 F.3d at 734. 225 Id. Id. at 737. 228 Id. at 740. Qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability under § 1983 for actions taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Thus, before liability will attach, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.
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theory. 230 The court held that there was no evidence that the parties were deliberately indifferent 231 or that the individual officials were "responsible for assuring the safety of the home, evaluating [the foster mother's] fitness as a parent, or placing [the child] in foster care."
232 At best, the facts, as alleged, established negligence, but they were not enough to satisfy the deliberate indifference standard. 233 Other cases have also held strictly to the deliberate indifference standard, even when children have died in foster care. 234 Only recently have plaintiffs had success, but only on the deliberate indifference standard and only when the defendants had actual knowledge of the harm. In H.A.L. v. Foltz, 235 Florida DSS was held liable for sexual abuse in the foster home because "no reasonable person in [the] [d]efendants' place could have believed that, by doing nothing to protect the children, they could carry out their duties consistently with the Constitution."
236 According to the court, the defendants actually knew about the substantial risk of harm in the Shick home, and nevertheless acted with deliberate indifference. 237 Other cases have held likewise. 238 As the Doe ex rel.
Johnson v. South Carolina Department of Social Services
239 court noted, in a claim regarding violations of due process during a child's adoption, the state has "some responsibility for 230 Id.
231
Id. at 634. 232 Id.
233
Id. at 635. Id. at 1231. 237 Id. at 1232 ("Taken together, these factors show that Defendants actually knew, and were deliberately indifferent to, the substantial risk of Plaintiffs being sexually abused in the Shick home."). [the child's] safety and general well-being." 240 But that certainly does not "mean that every child in foster care may prevail in a § 1983 action against state officials."
241
Only one court has held that the professional judgment standard is appropriate, 242 but it was never actually applied since the case, a class action, ended in a consent decree. According to the Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue 243 court, state officials act in place of parents for foster children, who have done nothing wrong. 244 Therefore, "foster children are entitled to a high standard. Something more than refraining from indifferent action is required to protect these innocents."
245 Unfortunately, "something more" was not clearly defined or applied to specific plaintiffs, and this case was not reported. 246 On the bright side, the consent decree forced the state to achieve and sustain some 31 outcomes in order to address constitutional concerns over foster care placements.
247
The Kenny A. court actually followed the constitutional standard that should be applied to foster children based on the Supreme Court's other Fourteenth Amendment due process jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has recognized the substantive due process rights of other analogous, and less sympathetic, populations. According to the Supreme Court, prisoners, Id.
244
Id. ("The compelling appeal of the argument for the professional judgment standard is that foster children, like involuntarily committed patients, are 'entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions' than criminals. These are young children, taken by the state from their parents for reasons that generally are not the fault of the children themselves. The officials who place the children are acting in place of the parents." (quoting LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 996 (D.D.C. 1991))). The court applied the professional judgment standard in deciding that there were genuine issues of material fact for trial, but the issues were never adjudicated for more clarity on what or how social services should apply professional judgment. The court only found that the state departed from minimal professional standards by failing to (1) adequately investigate and respond to allegations of abuse, (2) ensure reasonable caseloads for caseworkers, (3) ensure that caseworkers regularly visit foster children to monitor their safety, (4) provide consistent casework services, (5) maintain accurate and timely casework documentation, and (6) adequately screen and approve foster homes. Id. at *4. 
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CIVIL 253 the Court rejected the deliberate indifference standard because the right to safety for the institutionalized was an "unquestioned duty" 254 of the state and was one of the "essentials of the care that the state must provide." 255 Because the mentally disabled, unlike convicts, have not been found guilty of any wrongdoing, government officials cannot make decisions that constitute a substantial departure from "professional judgment," causing injury to these liberty interests. 256 The Court rejected the state's argument that the Eighth Amendment subjective deliberate indifference or criminal recklessness standard should govern the due process rights of those who are civilly, as opposed to criminally, committed in state institutions.
257
Why then, when courts hold state foster care agencies accountable, will they do so only on the deliberate indifference standard? Foster children are even more defenseless and sympathetic than involuntarily committed adults. They are innocent children, the mere subjects (for better or worse) of the state's actions against their parents, not them. 258 When a child is placed in foster care, the state assumes the role of parent to a most vulnerable population. As one federal court acknowledged, "[b]y 'finding the children and placing them with state approved families . . . , the state assumes an important continuing, if not immediate, responsibility for the child's wellbeing.'" 259 Biological parents have their children taken away every day in this country for actions which fall far below the "deliberate indifference" standard; 260 surely state parents should be required to make professional judgments about their children. Bell, 441 U.S. at 531 (The confinement of pretrial detainees indiscriminately with convicted persons is unconstitutional unless such a practice is "reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security.").
253
Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307. 254 Id. at 324.
255
256
Id. at 323. 257 Id. at 325.
258
As demonstrated throughout this Article, state actions are often biased and subjective. 
i. Pretrial Detainees and Prisoners
Pretrial detainees and prisoners have a constitutional right to be protected from state actions, or lack thereof, which lead to their suicide. 261 In order to prevail in a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove deliberate indifference on the part of the state. However, deliberate indifference can be demonstrated when prison officials should know about a suicide risk and fail to take reasonable or professional steps to prevent the suicide. 262 In Estate of Miller ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 263 the court held that the intake nurse, psychology associate, and prison guards were all subjectively aware that an inmate was a suicide risk. The prison officials did not need actual knowledge; they "either knowingly or recklessly disregarded it."
264 Once the subjective knowledge risk is established, they are accountable for taking "reasonable steps" to prevent the harm from the inmate's suicidal tendencies. 270 an inmate, who had attempted suicide in the past and whose mother had warned the prison of his tendencies, wrote a last will and testament and refused to eat while in his cell. The guards were therefore liable when he covered his cell windows with toilet paper, fashioned a noose from his sheets, and asphyxiated himself. 271 According to the court, "it seems quite possible that . . . the guards could have been aware of the risk that Matt would commit suicide [,] " 272 yet they failed to take "reasonable steps to prevent" it. 273 The prison guards were accountable for reckless disregard-not actual knowledge-and for their lack of reasonable action. 274 The language in these prison suicide cases resembles the language of a professional judgment standard. 275 Even when ostensibly applying the term "deliberate indifference," the courts look to the totality of circumstances to determine whether due process was deprived. 276 The courts find enough evidence when state officials fail to be reasonable. 277 This line of cases is helpful for making an argument for liability for foster runaways. In runaway and missing foster child cases, a confluence of factors contribute to their absence from care and the harms that ensue.
ii. Involuntarily Committed Adults
Involuntarily committed adults in mental institutions who harm themselves because they are unsupervised are also protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. The professional judgment standard has been applied. 267 Id. at 710. 268 Id.
269
Id. In Gann v. Schramm, 278 Gann escaped from the ward by picking the lock on the screen to his window. 279 He was apprehended by a state policeman after a 15 minute absence. 280 Upon his return, he was strip searched for contraband and then examined by another staff doctor who ordered a sleeping pill for him.
281
The next morning, doctors came to see Gann while on their morning rounds. He was still asleep and they decided not to wake him but continued "close observation."
282 After a roll call that same evening, Gann was reported missing again. A search of the ward was instituted and Gann was not found. 283 The next morning, Gann was found dead in the closet of his room in the Admissions Ward.
284 A plastic bag like the type used in the facility's kitchen was found over his head. 285 The court held that the employees could be constitutionally liable for this series of events under a professional judgment standard. 286 The court held, quoting Youngberg, that "liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment."
287
Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne
288 also involved a patient running away from involuntary commitment. The parents of a son who was diagnosed with bipolar disorder brought a § 1983 suit for the death of the son after he eloped from the hospital. 289 The court held that even though it was a private hospital, it was "clothed" with the authority of state law through its contract with the state, among other things, 290 and it acted under color of state law for purposes of the § 1983 claim. 291 The Fourteenth Amendment protected Schorr's due process rights to be free from harm when involuntarily committed, including during the period he had run away, and therefore the suit was allowed to go forward. Id. at 1446. 280 Id.
281
282
283
284
285
286
Id. at 1451. Id.
290
Id. at 496. 291 Id.
292
iii. Nursing Home Residents
An analogy can also be made to nursing home elopement and wandering cases. About 10% of all lawsuits involving nursing homes deal with elopements, or wandering. 293 Nursing homes are required by law to provide adequate supervision to prevent wandering and the related complications and injuries. 294 Nursing homes regulated by federal law can now also be liable for deprivation of the due process rights of their voluntary residents. In Grammer v. John J. Kane Regional Centers, 295 the Third Circuit allowed a § 1983 claim to go forward against a nursing home whose failure to provide proper care and supervision resulted in the death of a resident from malnourishment and pressure sores.
If all of these populations-prisoners, mentally disabled adults, and the elderly-have some form of constitutional right to be free from harms that result from improper care and lack of supervision, surely the most vulnerable and powerless population in the custody of the state should be entitled to the same. Child wards of the state are, by definition, held involuntarily and in need of deliberate, meaningful decision making by their guardians. They are not legally permitted to run away or be missing. Their guardians are the ones responsible for losing them. In fact, under age 18, they are not legally able to make any of their own decisions. Surely these young people should not be responsible for ensuring their own constitutional rights.
B. The Foster Child's Right To Be Free from Harm When Missing
There have been a handful of Fourteenth Amendment cases regarding runaway and missing foster children, with varying results and no precedent.
296
Several cases simply follow the deliberate indifference standard. In Smith v. District of Columbia, 297 a 17-year-old was living in an apartment as part of an independent living program. 298 There was little oversight and procedure for selecting these companies or the management of the programs. 299 There were also problems with the staff itself, including a counselor buying marijuana for 301 In violation of curfew, the plaintiff and his roommate let a visitor into their apartment who shot and killed them. The murders brought the death toll of youths living in the facility "to three out of sixteen (a fourth would be murdered by the end of the year)." 302 The court held that by not adopting any criteria for independent living programs and falling "below what national standards of care require of states [,] " DSS was deliberately indifferent to the victim's welfare. 303 Nicini v. Morra 304 also used the deliberate indifference standard. Plaintiff was 15 years old when he went to the hospital after an attempted suicide, and told caseworkers that his father physically abused him. 305 Plaintiff was placed in two foster homes but ran away; he was subsequently sent by DSS to live with the Morra family. 306 He ran away from the Morras and then from the hospital to which he was admitted for psychiatric evaluation. He ran back to the Morras and it was eventually arranged that the plaintiff would be placed back in their home. 307 Caseworkers checked the home and said that everything was positive, and there were no records of sexual abuse when the caseworker performed background checks on the family. 308 The state and courts understood the plaintiff's placement as an unofficial home, not a foster home. 309 The plaintiff later ran away again from the Morras' home, and "told investigators that since the second or third day of his arrival there, Edward Morra [the uncle] had been providing him with drugs and alcohol and assaulting him sexually." 310 It was later discovered that the uncle had prior convictions of "corrupting the morals of a minor and for distribution of controlled substances to minors" and was found guilty for his actions with the plaintiff. 311 In the child's § 1983 suit against DSS, the court held that even though the Morras were not a foster home, the plaintiff was in state custody and the state placed the plaintiff in the Morra home over the objections of his parents and aunt, so the placement was a 300 Id. at 91. 301 Id. 314 hinted at a standard higher than deliberate indifference, but still did not establish a clear constitutional right for runaways. 315 Tate had a pattern of running away from home and was involuntarily committed to a low-security juvenile facility operated by DSS. 316 While under the supervision of two staff members, Tate ran away with some young adult males, and at some point while away from the center, Tate claims she was raped. 317 Tate alleged the staff violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by allowing her out of sight and failing to prevent her from running away. 318 The court stated, "the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the state 'an unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within the institution,'" 319 and found that the staff knew Tate displayed a compulsion toward risky sexual behavior (running away before with young adult males), a diminished capacity for selfcontrol, and a known propensity for truancy. 320 Her status as a state ward was predicated on the judgment that she required supervision to avoid endangering 312 Id. at 809. The court found that her impulsivity and unrestrained sexuality resulted in a serious danger to herself that may be likened to a suicidal impulse. As such, the court found it compelling that other courts have found that summary judgment is inappropriate where hospital staff disregard a serious risk of suicide. her own health and safety.
321 Thus, the staff should have foreseen the substantial risk, and therefore, their motion for summary judgment was denied. 322 Ward ex rel. Bazerman v. Feaver 323 went further in establishing liability, but still fell short of declaring a constitutional right for runaways and missing foster children. Foster child Valerie Ward was raped while missing from her foster home. 324 The court found that the state could be held responsible for the crime committed against Valerie because she had a tendency to run away, which the state was aware of; she was not properly supervised or cared for in her foster home; and she was placed in a foster home rife with problems, thereby exposing her to danger and harm. 325 The court stated, children in foster homes, unlike children in public schools, are isolated; no persons outside the home setting are present to witness and report mistreatment. The children are helpless. Without the investigation, supervision, and constant contact required by statute, a child placed in a foster home is at the mercy of the foster parents. 326 The Ward court drew on other cases to show where it would draw the line in terms of state responsibility for a child in custody. In Zemola v. Johnson, 327 plaintiff Elizabeth Zemola was placed in a group home known to be loosely structured and dangerous, even though the state was aware of Zemola's suicidal tendencies, lack of self-control, and violent background, and it believed she should be placed in a highly structured environment with close psychiatric monitoring. 328 While in the group home she was introduced to pimps, used as a prostitute for child pornography, and given drugs. 329 The court found that placing Zemola in such a "snake pit," constituted a violation of her constitutional rights. 330 Moreover, the court found no qualified immunity would apply because it was "self-evident that by placing Zemola in an environment 321 Tate, 2008 WL 3318733, at *5. 322 Id.
323
where she would be expected to be abused by outsiders" her constitutional rights were violated. 331 In contrast, in Cooper v. Montgomery County Office of Children & Youth, 332 the district court granted the state's motion to dismiss because the causal link between what happened to the foster child when physically outside of the foster home-he was struck by a truck and killed while crossing the street-was too remote. 333 In the Ward case, while the defendants tried to argue that Valerie was not harmed by the foster parent or on foster home premises, the court made a distinction, saying that Valerie's psychological problems and tendency to run away reinforced the state's affirmative duty to the child. 334 Valerie's actual location at the time of the injury did not take away from the duties owed by the state given the circumstances. 335 The court dismissed the state's motion to dismiss 336 and denied qualified immunity.
337
One wrongful death case also provides guidance because it involved a crime committed against a runaway who was not a foster child at the time of the murder but was receiving child welfare services at home. In Tobias v. County of Racine, 338 the adolescent was in foster care and had a history of running away from home and subsequently from foster home placements.
339
The teenager was returned to her mother, but the mother signed a voluntary agreement to continue services with social services. 340 Four months later, the teenager ran away again to a dangerous part of the county. 341 After this incident, the caseworker went to the apartment and concluded that it was safe and left her there as long as she agreed to go to counseling. 342 A few days later, the teenager was shot and killed near the apartment. 343 The teenager's mother brought a wrongful death action against the county for negligence "when it 331 Id. Id. at *5. 334 Ward, 2000 WL 34025227, at *6. 335 Id.
336
Id. at *9. 337 However, the court did not foreclose raising the qualified immunity defense when it may be more appropriate. Id. at *8. 338 Tobias v. Cnty. of Racine, 507 N.W.2d 340, 340 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). 339 Id.
340
Id. at 341. 341 Id.
342
343
failed to issue a capias order" for the teenager's arrest. 344 The court held that the injury was too remote because it was not foreseeable that a "third person would commit a crime against [the teenager] because of the opportunity created by the county's negligence." 345 The court, however, stated that the county was negligent in not issuing the capias because it should have been aware that it was unsafe for the teenager to be out in the streets. 346 Although the crime was a superseding cause, the court left open the possibility for state liability in a runaway case of a child who was not even in custody of the state, but only receiving state services.
C. The Foster Child's Right To Be Free from Harm Following Discharge-Analogy to State-Created Danger Cases
No cases have been brought alleging constitutional violations for harms suffered by a foster child, or class of foster children, after official discharge from foster care. But an analogy can be made to the "state-created danger" cases, in which the government is held constitutionally liable for actions towards private citizens who are not in their custody, and are often less sympathetic, than foster children. 347 The state-created danger doctrine was first developed by the Seventh Circuit in White v. Rochford 348 and Bowers v. DeVito. 349 That court held that the Constitution protects persons who, while not in state custody, are nevertheless placed by the state in a position of danger and then left defenseless. According to the Seventh Circuit, when the state, by its actions, throws a person in a "snakepit," the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process is triggered. 350 Similarly, in Wood v. Ostrander, 351 the Ninth Circuit held that police officers could be liable for the rape of the car's passenger after the police left her on the side of the road in a high crime area. Davis v. Brady 352 also involved police stopping a drunk driver. There, the police were responsible for the drunk driver's injuries after the police left the driver with his keys, and the driver later 344 Id. A capias order is "an order to arrest and detain an individual for the purpose of guaranteeing a court appearance." THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/article/ what-is-a-capias-warrant/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) . 345 Tobias, 507 N.W.2d at 342. 346 collided with another vehicle. 353 The court, like the Ninth Circuit in Wood, held that it was the government that put this person in danger and the government should be held liable. 354 Similarly, in Munger v. City of Glasgow, 355 police were called to a bar when there was a dispute and ultimately kicked a man out of the bar and took away his keys. It was a cold night and he was dressed just in jeans and a t-shirt. 356 The police would not let him back into the bar or his car. 357 The man died of hypothermia. 358 The court held that the government created the danger and the government was responsible for depriving his life without due process. 359 Even pretrial detainees have such rights. In Paine v. Johnson, 360 the guardian of the estate of the pretrial detainee, who allegedly suffered from bipolar disorder, brought suit against the city and city police officers. The plaintiff alleged civil rights violations in connection with the detainee's arrest and subsequent release from custody to a high risk situation, given her mental condition, in which she was ultimately raped. 361 Police officers were denied summary judgment because fact issues existed as to whether the officer who released the detainee from custody violated the detainee's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 362 Significantly, the court held that many factors or conduct of two or more persons may operate at the same time, either independently or together, to cause injury or damage; in such case each may be the proximate cause of an injury, as required to establish liability under the Constitution. 363 Moreover, the court held that legal causation is a fact-specific inquiry and involves consideration of time, geography, range of potential victims, and the nature of harm that occurred. 364 state-created danger doctrines discussed in Part IV, we can begin to develop jurisprudence for missing and discharged foster children.
380
VII. CONCLUSION Youths aging out of foster care are one of the most vulnerable populations in this country. That we should allow them to transition from foster care to dire outcomes, only occasionally holding their custodians to minimal constitutional standards, is unacceptable. The sexual exploitation of adolescents involved with the child welfare system has recently gained much needed attention. The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, discussed in Section III.B, will also help establish the right of missing and discharged foster children to be free from sexual exploitation. The Act must be publicized, the records kept and reported, and the training disseminated. This will be hard work, especially at the front lines. As CWLA, the only group to publish a handbook on working with youths missing from care 381 emphasizes, those who work with children in care must proactively . . . prevent missing-from-care episodes, rather than merely reacting once a child has gone missing . . . successful prevention efforts are built on sound administration; quality supervision; effective training; and frequent contacts between workers and caregivers, works and children in care, and children and their birth families and relatives.
382
The problem, however, has gone on far too long to wait for the legislation to trickle down to front line caseworkers. Legislation targeted at adolescents in foster care, going back to 1999, has not put an end to the harsh 380 An example of a court using a general legal principle established by federal courts to apply to another context is also found in Gann: "Further support that this right to safety was clearly established may be found in some of the eighth amendment prison cases." 606 F. Supp. at 1450 (emphasis added). In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court noted that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" violates the Eighth Amendment. 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) . Individuals who are involuntarily confined in a mental hospital certainly should have no less rights than a prisoner. N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Indeed, "[i]t would be anomalous to find that the right to a secure environment, which federal courts have often intervened to protect in the context of penal institutions, did not extend to facilities for the mentally retarded." Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 162 (3d Cir. 1980). Thus, in December 1980, the right to a safe environment for those involuntarily committed to mental institutions had received wide acceptance by the courts. The right was a general, well developed legal principle that officials at a state mental hospital should have been applying daily. If they did not do so, they have forfeited the privilege of official immunity. 381 CWLA, supra note 21, at X-XV.
Id. at 9. realities of aging out. Statutes and rhetoric can only do so much. Those legally in charge of young people must be accountable for protecting them. Sexual exploitation should not be an inevitable outcome of the United States foster care system.
